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ABRAMS v. JOHNSON
117 S. CT 1925 (1996).
I.

FACTS

In Abrams v.Jobnson,' the Supreme Court held that
no congressional district may be drawn with race as a predominant factor in its formation. The need for redistricting
arose in Georgia in 1990, when population growth resulted in an authorized increase of congressional seats from
ten to eleven. The Georgia legislature held a special session inAugust 1991, and on October 1, 1991, it submitted a
plan with two majority-black districts, as required by §5 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, to the Attorney General of
the United States for preclearance. The Attorney General
refused to approve the first plan; the legislature then created another plan which was also denied. Instead, the
Department of Justice proposed an alternative plan with
three majority-black districts that had been drafted by the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The Georgia
Legislature adopted the ACLU's plan, and the 1992
November elections were held under this plan. Black candidates were elected from all three majority-black districts.
In 1994, five white voters from Georgia's Eleventh
Congressional District alleged racial gerrymandering. 8
"Racial gerrymandering" is the division of a state into political districts in a manner that can be shown to be racially
motivated. In this situation, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia found the Eleventh
Congressional District invalid: the Supreme Court affirmed
in Miller v.Jobnson.The Court found in Miller that race was
the predominant factor in drawing the district's configuration and that the Georgia legislature "was driven by its policy of maximizing• majority black
districts Abrams stemmed
I0
from the rulings on remand. The trial court
11
deferred to the
Georgia legislature to draw a new plan. However, the legislature could not reach an agreement. As a result, the court
drew its own plan and the 1996 general elections were held
under the court's plan. 3 The trial court's plan contained only
one majority-black district. Various private voters and the
United States brought this suit contending that (1) the trial
court must defer to the Georgia legislature's plans and thus
cannot create an electoral district; (2) black voting strength
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in Georgia had been weakened and diluted in violation of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2; (3) the change in voting
procedure led to a retrogression of voting position for black
voters; and (4) the district court's plan violated Article 1 § 2
of the United States Constitution, which guarantees one per14
son, one vote.
II. HOLDING
The Supreme Court held that the district court was not
required to defer to the prior legislative plans which would
have created two or three majority-black districts, for, the
court would thereby be instating plans that used race as a
predominant factor. Further, the Supreme Court held that
the black vote was not impermissibly diluted by the district
court's choice not to create a second majority-black district.
The Court found that the black population was not sufficiently compact for a second majority-black district, and16
took place.
therefore no dilution of black voting strength
Moreover, it held that the black voting position was not
weakened by the district court's decision not to create a
second majority-black district. 17 The Supreme Court
believed that the plaintiffs failed to show that an actual retrogression of voting power had taken place since the district court's plan had been implemented. Finally,the Court
found that the district court's population deviation of 0.11%
is well within the one person, one vote requirement under
Article 1, § 2, of the Constitution.' 9 The Court held that
slight deviations are allowable when legitimate state policies are involved; and, the district court's concern of cutting
through Georgia's core districts and communities of interest was found to be legitimate. 0 Further, the Court reasoned
that Georgia's fast growing population causes population
shifts which account for the deviation and, thus, another
reapportionment would be futile."
III.ANALYSIS
The plaintiffs assert that the district court erred by.
not following the Georgia legislature's intent. 2 The
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Supreme Court stated in Upham v. Seamon"3 that the

court as a general rule "should be guided by the legislative policies underlying the existing plan, to the extent
those policies do not lead to violations of the
Constitution or the Voting Rights Act."" However, the
Court held that the legislature's precleared plan was constitutionally flawed because race was a predominant factor in the drawing of the electoral districts. The Court
stated that the districts had to high a population deviation and were of such shape to show the racial formation
behind the districts creation.26 Thus, the Supreme Court
concluded that the district court did not err by deciding
not to create a second majority-black district, for to do so
would have violated the Constitution.
In Abrams, the plaintiffs stated that the district
court's plan also resulted in an impermissible vote dilution, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.'
This section reaches any prerequisite to voting practice
or procedure imposed by any state or political subdivision. Voting dilution, a violation of Section 2, has
occurred if it can be shown that "the political processes
leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of [a racial minority] ...in that its members

have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice."30 The Supreme Court
also concluded that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
does apply to court-ordered redistricting plans.
In Thornburg v. Gingles,3' the Supreme Court put

forth a three-part test which must be met in order to
establish a vote dilution claim under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act.3 3 A plaintiff must show that (1) the
minority group is "sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district;" (2) the minority group is "politically cohesive;" and
(3) the majority votes "sufficiently as a bloc to enable it.
. .to defeat the minority's preferred candidate."34 If a
plaintiff meets these conditions, the court considers
whether the minorities have been denied an equal
opportunity to participate in the political process."
The Court, when utilizing the Gingles test, first
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The Section 2 compactness requirement should take into
account the concern of maintaining traditional communities of interest and traditional boundaries and, the district
court's redistricting plan took these factors into account.46
The district court also found, and the Supreme Court
again agreed, that the record failed to show that racially
47
polarized voting had occurred. The most recent elections under the court's plan resulted in all three black
incumbents being re-elected, two of whom defeated
white candidates in majority-white districts. 4 " The
Supreme Court concluded that these election results
established a general willingness of white voters to vote
for black candidates and not to act as a bloc against the
minority-preferred candidate. 49 Therefore, the second
50
and third parts of the Gingles test were not met.
The plaintiffs further contended that Section 5 of
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examined the contention that to create a second majority-black district in Georgia would allow for race to be a
predominate factor in drawing district lines. 36 The Court
concluded that race was a predominant factor behind
the districting plan. 7 Thus, the districting plan must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest; and, the standard of strict scrutiny must be
applied. 9 The Court concluded that compliance with
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which is the guarantee
of equal participation in the political process, can be
considered a compelling state interest. Here, the Court
believed that the districting plan was in compliance with
Section 2 and therefore a compelling state interest existed.4 ' Further, it was found that no vote dilution, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, would occur as
a result of the new districting plan.4 2 The Court held that
none of the three Gingles factors which are necessary
for a vote dilution claim were established here and there43
fore the districting plan passes the strict scrutiny test.
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court and
held that the black population at issue was not sufficiently compact to warrant the creation of a second majorityblack district and thus did not pass the first requirement
of the Gingles test. The Court held that Section 2 does
not require the districting plan to create, on predominant45
compact."
ly racial lines, a district that is not "reasonably

44

U.S. 30 (1986).

33

Abrams, 117 S.Ct. at 1935.

34,d.

3Id.
'I1d. at 1936.

Id.
Id.
4Id
46
Id.
47
Id.
4Id. at 1937.
491d
50O

the Voting Rights Act was violated." This section requires
that jurisdictions obtain preclearance by the Attorney
General or approval from the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia for any change in procedure with respect to voting and requires that the
change have neither the effect nor the purpose of denying or interfering with the right to vote on account of
race or color. 2 The purpose of Section 5 is to insure that
a change in voting procedure will not lead to a retrogression in the voting position of racial minorities.53 The
Supreme Court looked to the 1982 districting plan,
which established one majority-black voting district.54
The 1982 plan had been in effect in Georgia for a decade
55 as a needed benchmark to check voting
and thus served
retrogression. A benchmark to measure the proposed
voting practice with the existing voting practice is needed in order to determine whether retrogression had
56
occurred . The plaintiffs claimed that under the 1982
plan one of the ten districts was black, while under the
district court's proposed plan, there would still only be
one majority-black district, but, it would be one of eleven
57
districts. Thus, the plaintiffs asserted, there was a one
percent retrogression; as a result blacks, do not have the
58
same voting opportunities
under the district court's
redistricting plan. However, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Voting Rights Act does not require that a
population increase automatically warrants
the addition
59
of a new majority-minority district.
Finally, the plaintiffs contended that the district
court's plan violatedArticle I Section 2 of the Constitution,
which requires congressional districts to achieve the oneperson, one-vote principle, as 'nearly as is practicable.'60
The one-person, one-vote principle prohibits the state
dilution of the right to vote by requiring that the number
of persons in each state-created voting district may not
vary significantly. Further, court-ordered redistricting
plans should have "de minimis variation" and are held to
higher standards of population equality than legislative
61
plans. Population deviation is the average of all districts'
deviation from the precise one person, one vote allocation.6 The district court's plan had an average deviation of
0.11%, the lowest of any plan. 63 Further, the district court
did not want to split existing counties and instead strove
to maintain core districts and communities of interest.6
Moreover, the population fluctuations which occur con-
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sistently make it difficult to be precise. The Supreme
Court held that this deviation was acceptable and did not
violate the one-person, one-vote requirement.66
The Supreme Court believed that redistricting is best
67
done by the legislature. However, when as here, the legislative plans are in violation of the Constitution and the
legislature is unable to correct this defect, it is appropriate for the court to step in. The Supreme Court believed
that the district court took all the appropriate precautions and thus developed a constitutionally sound plan.
IV. CONCLUSION
The use of racial gerrymandering to create vote dilution and political voting blocs are both dangers which
cannot be ignored and which the Court in Abrams recognized. Yet, the fact that a court drew up the plan is
troublesome. The Court did conclude that redistricting
is best done by the legislature. 9 However, the Court further stated that in cases such as this when the legislative
plan is in violation of the Constitution, a court may draw
70
up a districting plan. I find this to be too much of an
encroachment of the judiciary into the legislature's
realm of power.
The election process is one of a purely legislative
nature. The judiciary should oversee the electoral
process, but, not dominate the process.The Court tries to
limit the judiciary's role by stating that intervention
should only occur in cases where the legislative plan's
constitutional defect cannot be corrected by the legislature.7 1 The result of such a decision is an expanded judiciary and a limited legislature. How many tries does the
legislature exactly get at drawing up these districts?
Does someone actually have to bring suit against the
state or can a court, if it see fit, examine every districting
plan to determine its constitutional soundness?
The Court leaves open the door for too much judicial activism. I believe that it is the role of the court to
decide whether a districting plan passes constitutional
muster. However, the legislature should be the branch of
government which draws up all the final districts. No
where in the Constitution does it give the judiciary the
power to draw up electoral districts. This power is neither explicitly granted to the legislature in the
Constitution. Yet, elections and electoral districts have to
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be considered within the legislature's realm of power
because elections convey the will of the people within
the legislature. Constituents can use the power of elections to make their representatives accountable for their
actions. Therefore, electoral districts are an integral part
of the effective running of the legislative branch and fall
within the legislature's realm of power.
To allow courts to draw up these electoral districts,
is yet another broad interpretation of the power that the
Constitution actually grants to the judiciary. There must

be a line drawn to the extent that the Supreme Court can
find "implied powers" in the Constitution. There is a very
grave danger in allowing the Court to keep reading into
the Constitution and using these "implied powers" to
upset the delicate balance between the branches.
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